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DR. REED'S LECTURE.
During the month Dr. Reed delivered
before the combined law societies a lecture
on William E. Gladstone. Dr. Reed'slectures arr always fine examples of oratory
and thought. This one was notonlyso in
a general way; from the great mass of material surrounding and composing the
character, Gladstone, the lecturer chose
those features which appeal more especially to the student of law, and with keen
analysis placed before the students those
elements of character which, though exemplified almost perfectly in the life of
England's great son, are universal in their
application. Great natural physique carefully trained with a view to health, capacity for hard work, singleness of purpose,
purity of morals, fearlessness of criticism,
were shown to be not only elements precedent to the greatness of Gladstone, but
essentials to the character of any one
who will succeed "amid the tremendous
competition of this age." We are sure
every student left the lecture room with a
better realization of what constitutes true

success, and a firm conviction that "the
man who gets on in this world must have,
above all other things, a tremendous capacity for toil."
ALUMNI NOTES.
Robert P. Stewart, 1900, has recently
had a signal success in defending a man
on trial for murder. The assault was not
denied. The verdict was guilty of assault
and battery only. The newspapers of
Deadwood, 'South Dakota, speak in high
praise of the skill and eloquence of the defence.

William H. Trude, '01, was admitted to
the bar of Huntingdon county, October 14.
He is now practicing his profession in
Huntingdon, and has his office with ExJudge Furst and son.
Howard Henderson, '01, was admitted
to the bar of his home county, Oct. 14, has
since been admitted to the Supreme and
Superior Courts and is now located with
his brother, in the practice of law, at
Altoona.
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Among the visitors in town during the
month were William A. Jordan, '99;
George W. Coles, '98; and W. H. Taylor,
'01.
Gabriel H. Moyer, '98, and Miss Bertha
Elizabeth Smith, of Palmyra, were married Nov. 28th.
SCHOOL NOTES.
A very able and interesting article by
Professor Frederic C. Woodward on "Imipossibility of Performance, as an Excuse
for Breach of Contract," appears in the
December issue of The Columbia Law Review. Professor Woodward, aside from
being a very able and painstaking instructor, is rapidly attaining prominence
as a writer on legal topics.
We are pleased to note an addition to
our list of exchanges by the acquisition of
The CanadianLaw Review. It is an upto-date publication and we can recommend its perusal.
Leidy, '97, has been appointed assistant
district attorney of Berks county, and enjoys an excellent practice.
Guy Thorne and A. C. McIntire, of the
Senior class, have already been admitted
to the bar; the former in Mercer county,
the latter to the several courts of West
Virginia. Both of these gentlemen will,
however, complete their course in the
school.
We deeply regret to learn that the father
of Claycomb, of the Middle class, died on
December 6th. We extend to him the
sincere condolence of the entire body of
students.
At the recent election of officers for the
Athletic Association of the college, Archibald M. Hoagland, '03, of the Law School,
was chosen Vice-President.
A Law School basket ball team has been
organized and bids fair to make a good
showing during the season. The participants are: Center, Vastine, '03; Guards,
Adamson, '02, Keelor, '03; Forwards,
Hoagland, '03, Lonergan, '02. A series of
games is soon to be played between the
Law School, College, and Preparatory
School.

The subject of oursketch. Ruby R. Vale,
Esq., was born at Carlisle, Pa., October 19,
1874. His parents are Joseph G. and
Sarah Eyster Vale. After attending the
public schools of his native town he entered Dickinson College, graduating in
1896. Shortly afterward he was elected to
the principalship of the Milford, Delaware,
Classical School. This position he retained for two years when he returned to
Carlisle, entered the 'Dickinson School of
Law and graduated in the class of 1899.
In the same year he was admitted to the
bars of Cumberland county and Philadelphia. He has continued since that time
to practice his profession in the city of
Philadelphia. Commendable industry has
been evidenced by Mr. Vale since, aside
from the exactions of the life of a practitioner, he has, in the short while since
graduation arranged and indexed "The
Law of Negotiable Instruments" ; the
"Law of Mechanics' Liens"; has annotated the "Rules of the Superior Court of
Pennsylvania"; and has recently completed aconipilation on "Elementary Principles of Pennsylvania Law" in two volume, a review of which may be found, in
another columnn.
ALLISON SOCIETY.
Among the interesting features of the
programs rendered at the Allison society meetings during the past month
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were the contributions from the members
of the Junior class who have affiliated
themselves with this society. Each man
who had been selected for a contribution,
literary or oratorical, made thorough preparation for his number and as a result each
number was clear, comprehensive, and
enjoyable. This excellent work was gratifying to the older members and particularly to the members of the Executive
Committee. The society work is progressing now with a degree of enthusiasm
that warrants the assertion that this will
be the most successful year in the history
of the Allison.
Among the new men whose work attracted particular attention are: Carlin,
Benjamin, Yocum, Wilcox, Flynn, White
and .Hillyer.
Au a recent meeting, E. A. Delaney
told what effect the removal of Recorder
Brown will have on Pennsylvania politics.
Mr. Delaney's standing in the Republican
party and his thorough knowledge of State
politics surrounded his talk with a great
deal of interest. Mr. Lonergan, in an interesting manner, told what impressions
he received at the Buffalo Exposition. In
the line of elocution Mr. Wanner held forth
for two numbers.
The Executive Committee announced
that it has under consideration a session
of the National House of Representatives
and a session of some municipal bodies.
After the Christmas holidays the committee's plans will be sufficiently under way
to receive publication. At that time the
details of their plans will be given out, and
it is probable that the remainder of the
winter will be taken up with this work.

shown by a failure to attend. It is hoped
that a greater interest will be taken by
such members at the beginning of next
term.
In order to secure the advantages offered
by the society, attendance and taking part
in the programs is necessary. The Chinese Exclusion Act was discussed in a recent meeting, and a conclusion in favor of
exclusion arrived at. Extemporaneous
speeches have been a feature of the last
meetings. Many complicated situations
have been unraveled by the chair in parliamentary drill which follows the regular
program. This discipline should be of great
value to the students in situations which
they are likely to be called upon to fill
at a later period.

DICKINSON SOCIETY.

ELEMENTARY PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW
OF PENNSYLVANIA. By Ruby B?. Vale,
A. M., LL. B., of the PhiladelphiaBar.
Published in two volumes by George T.
Bisel, Philadelphia, Pa. Buckram and
calf 1229 pages.' Price?6.00.
What Blackstone did for the student of
the law of England, Mr. Vale has done for
the student of the law of Pennsylvania.
As its title suggests, the book gives a concise statement of elementary principles.
Whether at the threshold or at the close
of his course of study this is preeminently
what the student needs. As the Legal
Intelligencer has [stated, "It; is a notable

On Nov. 15th, in pursuance of an invitation from the Dickinson Society, Dr.
Reed delivered a lecture before the society
on Gladstone. He impressed upon the
minds of the students the value and necessity of making strenuous efforts to succeed in whatever is undertaken, and of the
duty of supporting a cause because of principle and not of policy. The lecture was
delivered in the Doctor's usual pleasing
manner and was greatly appreciated. A
number of the members seem indifferent
to the success of the regular meetings as

TIE DELTA CHL
Members of the Delta Chi took their
farewells for the holiday vacation on Friday evening, Dec. 13th, when a banquet
was held, at which the ideal spirit of fraternity which pervades the organization
was shown. A most delicious menu was
offered, and the diners enjoyed it. Songs
of Delta Chi were sung, history of its honorable career reviewed by talented members, and its deeds recalled.
Robert H. Moon was toastmaster and
responses to the toasts were pithy and
entertaining. Wit sparkled, humor and
repartee scintillated.
The banquet was a joyous, happy affair,
a delightful relaxation after a term of diligent, conscientious study.
BOOK REVIEWS.
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attempt to give the student of Pennsylvania law a supplement to Blackstone and
Kent, by placing in his hands a book
which states the general principles of law
as the decisions and statutes of Pennsylvania have respectively interpreted and
declared them."
We understand that a number of bar
examining committees have already added
the book to their required list of studies
and we are satisfied that this will soon be
universally true throughout the State.
The lucid and logical analysis of each sub
ject will be appreciated especially by the
student. When he feels that he is becoming lost in the intricacies of a subject.
let him take up his "elementary prin.
ciples" and return to terrafirma. In the
final preparation for an examination the
books will prove invaluable in clarifying
and systematizing his recollection on any
subject.
The definitions, wherever possible, have
been taken directly from Pennsylvania
decisions. They are both accurate and
succinct. On all subjects the book is
strictly up-to date. Important statutory
modifications made at the session of 1901
have been incorporated. No space has
been unwisely taken ip in attempting to
criticise the law as it is, nor in stating
propositions for which authority cannot
be cited. The leading and most instructive case has been cited on each point.
The student desiring a more extended dis_.
cussion of any subject is thus enabled to
turn directly to a Pennsylvania authority.
We are convinced that, while the very
full and carefully prepared index will
render the book invaluable to the practitioner as a work of ready reference, and
its combination of completeness and brevity will recommend it strongly to the layman, to the student of Pennsylvania law
it will promptly take its place as indispensable.
THE LAW OF CONTRACTS. By Edward
Avery Harriman. Second Edition. Bevised and Enlarged. Little, Brown &
Company, Boston: 1901, pp. LIV, 4,10.
Difficult, indeed, is the task of one who
attempts, in a limited space, to present a
complete view of so important a subject.
That this work approximates such an end
cannot well be questioned. The work

makes clear the fact that our law of contracts is the natural result of the development of legal procedure in England. It
points out and carefully explains the departures made by the American courts
from the principles of common law as applied by the English courts and tends to
convey an accurate conception of the
present state of American Law. The accuracy of statement throughout and the
clear exposition of many fundamental
principles is commendable. The general
recognition of theexcellenceof thetreatise
and the wide sale of the first edition renders an elaborate discussion of its merits
unnecessary. The size of the book has
been considerably increased by discussion;
numerous citations of recent cases have
been added, and for convenience duplicate reference has been made to the
National Reporter System. In itspresent
form it will be of great utility to the
student of law as well as to the general
practitioner.
THE LAvW OF REAL PROPERTY.
By
Charles T.Boone. Second Edition. San
Francisco: Bancroft- TVhitney Company,
1901. 3 vols. pp. XXVI, 612 632; XI1,
652. 16 mo.
The controlling idea of too many authors is that a certain amount of obscurity
heightens the effect of learning ; that the
chief aim of the writer should be to- indulge in elaborate discussion, advance
purely personal views, and set forth obsolete forms and doctrines sufficient to
enshroud the true conception of the law
in mystery. While this little work is not,
nor does it profess to be, a complete digest
of the law, nor yet an historical treatise,
it does put forward clearly and concisely,
in a convenient form, the American Law
of Real Prorerty. Where decisions are in
conflict, the opinions are referred to, as
they appear, without any attempt, on the
part of the author, to say which is correct.
As a reference manual, furnishing a convenient guide to the authorities, the work
should prove of great service to the practitioner.
THE QUEENS OF ENGLAND. By Mary
IHowitt. Revised by Geneve Armstrong.
llustrated,pp. 549, p1.50. B. S. Wasson
& Company, Chicago, Ill.
The lives of the forty-one women who
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have occupied the throne of England from
the time of Matilda of Flanders., wife of
William the Conqueror (1031-1084) down
to Victoria (1819-1901) either as Queens
regnant or Queens consort have, in this
work, been set forth with a great degree of
excellence. Comparison shows the accuracy of the data and this, combined
with the general literary excellence of the
book, renders it at once Interesting and
instructive. The general reader aawellas
the student of history will derive much
pleasure and profit from its perusal.
The followibg is a continuation of the
Moot Court cases:
Case.

Defendant.

Plaintiff.

No. 41. Kaufman,
Longbottom,
Mays,
Kline.
Delaney, Ed., J.
No. 42. Philips,
Gross,
Hamblen,
Hindman.
Wright, J.
Mfowry,
No. 43. Miller,

Watson,
Wright.
Peightel, J.
Vastine,
No. 44. Sherbine,
Yeagley,
Welsh.
Schnee, J.
No. 45. Conry,
Laubenstein.
McIntyre,
Points..
Lonergan, J.
No. 46. Moon,
Miiinich,
MacConnell,
No. 47. Turner,
Boryer,

Logan,
Sterrett.
J.
Brooks,
Osborne.

Rhodes, F., J.

tauffer,
No. 48. Schnee,
Williamson,
Vanner.
Hindman, J.
No. 49. Albertson,
Iillyer,
Donahoe,
IPeightel.
Brennan, J.

No. 50. Houck,
Jacobs, J. H.

Hugus,
Yocum.

Cooper,J.

No. 51. Flynn,
Dively,
Benjamin,
White.
Hoagland, J.

MOOT COURT.
JOHN CHILDS vs. ELECTRIC
RAILWAY CO.
Infant3-Imputed negligence-Contributoi-y
negligence ofparent-Questionfor jury.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

Childs, the next friend, sues the defendant for personal injury resulting from being
run over by acar. Plaintiff was four and
one-half years old, and in the street playing without oversight of his parents who
were accustomed to let him roam about
the streets at will. The car was coming
along the street at about six miles an hour
and there was no obstruction to the sight
of the child by the motorman, nor of the
car by the child, when the child started
across the street, the car being fifty feet
from him.
A loud conversation in the
car diverted theattention of the motorman
for a moment and this was followed by the
ringing of the bell to stop the car at which
the motorman turned to look into the car
with his face away from the child. On
turning forward he saw the child a few
feet in front of the car which he could not
stop until it had collided with the child,
doing serious injury to him. Defenses
were, first, negligenceon partof the child;
second, negligence on part of the parent;
third, no negligence on part of motorman.
Motion for non-suit.
ADAMSON and BROCK for plaintiff.

Negligence cannot be imputed to one
who has not sufficient understanding to
guard against it. 62 Pa. 269, 74 Pa. 431,
31 Pa. 3.58, 193 Pa. 555.
An infant may recover for injuries partly caused by his own imprudent act but
his father'cannot. 57 Pa. 172, 113 Pa. 412.
THoRNE and TURNER for defendant.
Cited 142 Pa. 471, 57 Pa. 172, 92 Pa. 450,
5 W. N. C. 93, Id. 119.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

It appears to be well settled in Pennsylvania that an action can be maintained by
an infant, notwithstanding the parent was
guilty of contributory negligenceand could
not himself maintain the action. Erie
Passenger Ry. Co. v. Schuster, 113 Pa.
412; Glass v. Railway Co., 57 Pa. 172.
There are numerous cases which hold
that a child of tender years cannot be
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charged with contributory negligence.
Schnur v. Citizens' Traction Co., 153 Pa.
30; Summers v. Brewing Co., 143 Pa. 114.
The sole question, then, for determination is, whether the defendant company
was guilty of negligence in the manner of
running its car at the time the accident
occurred, which is a question for the jury.
Schnur v. Citizens' Traction Co., 153 Pa.
30. We, therefore, see no reason why a
non-suit should be granted.
Motion refused.
R.

K.

MACCONNELL, J.

CONLY vs. BLAKELEY.
Becording of deeds- Notice- Actual-Constructive-Act of May 19, 1893.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

William Siever owning land, conveyed
it directly to his wife in 1899, and shortly
afterwards died, leaving her and one son,
Henry, surviving. His wife remained on
the farm, and acted toward it as owner,
until her death in August, 1900. She left
a will giving her son, Henry, one undivided half, and the other half to her sister, Sarah Conly. Henry conveyed the
farm thinking himself heir of it from his
father, to Blakeley, who paid a full price
for it, and had no actual notice of the conveyance of 1899, which, also, was not on
record. Sarah Conly conveyed her undivided half to John Conly for $2000, he
knowing of the conveyance to Mrs.
Siever, and of the devise to Sarah Conly.
Beakeley's deed was put on record at once,
but the deed to Mrs. Siever was never recorded. Blakeley knew, when he received
the conveyance and paid the money that
Mrs. Siever had occupied the land until
her death. Ejectment for one-half of the
land.
BRIOOK and MACCONNELL for the plaintiff.
While Blakeley had no actual notice, the
widow's remaining in possession for nearly
a year was sufficient to put him on inquiry, and he, therefore, was affected with
constructive notice. Lighiner v. Mooney,
10 Watts 407; Rowe v. Ream, 105 Pa.
546; Thrope v. Kendall, 5 Forum 47.
ELMES and POINTS for the defendant.
A bona fide purchaser from the heir, of
one who has given a deed which has not
been recorded within the statutory period,
will be protected from the claims of the

grantees in that deed. Powers v. McFerran, 2 S. & R. 44; Woods v. Farmere, 7
Watts 2"61 ; Farmer v. Fisher, 197 Pa. 114.
Possession is not notice except during
continuance and the vendee is not bound
to take notice of the antecedent possession
of third parties. Meehan v. Williams, 48
Pa. 238; Boggs v. Varner, 6 W. & S. 474;
Ballington v. Welsh, 5 Binn. 129.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
A deed not recorded within the time
fixed by the recording Act of 1893, is void,
as against a subsequent purchaser for a
valuable consideration without notice.
The Act aims to give notice to and protect subsequent purchasers. It thus follows that such purchasers, taking land
which they know to have been previously
conveyed by an unrecorded deed, will not
be protected. They may have actual
knowledge of the fact, or a legal inference
thereof from other facts and circumstances
already established. The latter is known
as implied or constructive notice, and is
the turning point in this case.
Such notice, though many times defined, is a phrase flexible in meaning and
must be understood as having reference to
the subsequent purchaser as well as to the
acts and attitude of the first purchaser.
What is constructive notice under ordinary circumstances is not under extraordinary. Customs, habits, and the relation of parties must all be considered in
the definition. It is ordinarily held that
a general possession is sufficient notice of
the possessor's title "to put a party on inquiry." But this will admit of qualifications and exceptions. (1) According to
the decisions, the possession must not
only be open and unequivocal at the time
of second sale, but must be sufficiently
distinct and reasonable under the circumstances as to avoid liability of a misunderstanding, or misconstruction, i. e., there
must be something in or about the pos.
session to attract the attention of the subsequent purchaser sufficient to put him on
his guard. (2) A rumor of conveyance
cannot always be considered constructive
notice: Plumer v. Robertson, 6 S. & R.
177; Jaques v. Weeks, 7 Watts 261. Justice Green said "Such information," to be
constructive notice, "must come from
some one interested in the property and
must be directly communicated to the
party sought to be affected." (3) Acting to-
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wards the property as owner is not enough
to put a party on inquiry: Meehan v.
Williams, 48 Pa. 238; Boggs v. Varner. 6
V. & S. 474; McMechan v. Griffing, 3
Pick. (Mass.) 149. In the latter case where
a person owning and in possession of a lot,
purchased an adjacent lot, or tract of
woodland previously unoccupied by the
grantor, and acted as owner in that he repaired fences, removed a small building,
sold trees and pastured cattle, the acts
failed to puta subsequent purchaser on inquiry, because similar acts in that locality, by custom, were not uncommon.
Hence the acts of ownership were not in
sufficient contrast to put a stranger on inquiry. (4) Possession is not always notice
of title in the possessor, for possession of
agent means the possession of the principal; the possession of guardian, that of
the ward ; the possession of the tenant at
will is the possession of the landlord; and
the possession of the mortgagor is in fact,
the possession of the mortgagee. If In the
case of the mortgagor and also a tenant
for a term of years, it can be argued that
their possession is notice of the one's right
to equity of redemption, and of the other's
title as lessee, it can likewise be contended
with as much force that the possession of
the widow in this case was notice of her
dower interest and no more. (5) Neither
are possession and acts of ownership combined at all times notice of the possessor's
title: Billington v. Welsh, 5 Binn. 129;
Plumer v. Robertson, 6 S. & R. 177. In
the latter, a mortgagee who subsequently
took a conveyance of the mortgaged property, was in possession six years and acted
towards the property as owner. The general rules as to possession can, therefore,
not be followed with safety and without
taking into consideration all the attendant facts and circumstances-the similar
acts occurring, and the relation of the
parties. In cases like the above mentioned it is not uncommon for the mortgagee to take possession and thus get the
benefit of the farm products for hig own
protection. His possession was not inconsistent with a perfect right in the
mortgagor to sell; whereas, but for his relation as mortgagee his possession would
have been enough to put a subsequent
purchaser on his guard.
So Mrs. Silver's remaining in possession

was in accordance with custom. In fact,
she had a right to remain until her dower
was meted out, and because of thus remaining for a year, no one to whom the
fact of her husband's conveyance had not
been communicated, would naturally infer her ownership. The fact that such inference was improbable, together with the
principle that "every presumption is in
favor of the subsequent purchaser," we
can not see in the light of all the circumstances that the defendant had enough
before him to put him on his guard and
from which he would naturally infer ownersliip in Mrs. Siever. Who elsewould be
expected to have possession of a det-tsed
husband's homestead but his widow and
children, if any? It does not appear
that the son was living alone and
separate from his mother, but granting
that he was, the fact that he conveyed
the property after her death, thinking
himself heir to it, is evidence that his
mother remained in possession with his
approval and without his knowledge of a
previous transfer 6f title. If her acts
thereon did not lead the son to infer ownership, much less reasonable is it to impute any such inference to a stranger.
] t is contended that the fact of the son's
having made the conveyance entitles the
subsequent purchaser to less protection
than if conveyed by the original grantor.
But the decisions are authority against
this view. Farmer v. Fisher, 197 Pa. 114;
Powers v. McFerran, 2 S. & R. 44.
In all the cases cited, where possession
gave title, it was such notorious, unambiguous and distinct possession as to put
the subsequent purchaser on his guard.
Not only were the parties in possession
from five to seventeen years, but their relations to each other were dissimilar to
the relations of the parties in this case.
That the plaintiff knew of Mr. Siever's
deed to his wife, makes him no object of
the law's mercy, inasmuch as he failed to
do what a careful purchaser should have
done, namely, to see that the deed was
recorded prior to his purchase.
As between plaintiff and defendant who,
it appears, never knew that Mrs. Siever
acted towards the farm as owner other
than remaining in possession, and who
purchased from the only lineal heir at law
supposed at the time to know in -whom
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the title was, the latter is entitled to the
protection of the statute. A non-suit is
accordingly entered in behalf of the defendant.
J. C. HOUSER, J.

We see no error in the decision of the
cause in the court below.
Judgment affirmed.

OPINION OF SUPERIOR COURT.

Liability of married women-SuretyFraud.

The deed of Siever to his wife, though
not recorded was valid against his heir,
Henry. But, when Henry conveyed to
Blakeley, the latter became entitled to the
protection of the recording acts. The deed
to Mrs. Siever was not recorded, nor had
Blakeley actual knowledge of it. Had he
constructive notice? The only fact that
could be construed into notice was the
possession and control of the premises by
Mrs. Siever. She was residing on the farm
prior to the conveyance to her. She continued, with her husband, to reside on it,
acting "toward it as owner," but no act
characteristic enough of ownership to
make Henry suspect that she was owner
was done, for after her death, he thought
himself heir of the land from his father,
and as such, sold it to Blakeley. The interval between the grant to Mrs. Siever
and her death was brief. She had a right
to occupy the premises until dower
should be assigned, and her possession
might easily and naturally be referred by
observers, and by Blakeley, to this right.
We cannot may that it should have awakened a suspicion in Blakeley's mind, that
she had become owner by an unrecorded
conveyance, of which her son had heard
nothing. Nor would it have been proper
for a jury to say, upon the evidence, that
'Blakeley ought to have inquired of some
ane. Of whom indeed could he have inquirpd?
When he bought, Mrs. Siever was dead.
He could not have inquired of her. There
Is no evidence that he knew of her will,
nor that Sarah Conly had taken a possession as devisee. He could not, therefore, have inquired of her. Henry, the
apparent owner, was conveying to him.
Inquiry from any one, therefore, was impracticable. It must be remembered that
It does not appear that when Blakeley
bought, Mrs. Siever's will had been admitted to probate. Inquiry from any one
who might have informed Blakeley of the
title of Mrs. Siever was therefore impracticable.

TATE vs. WILEY, ET AL.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

Mary Wiley drew a note for $1000, payable to her husband, Charles, who endorsed
it to Tate. Charles Wiley and wife asked
him for a loan of $1000, saying that they
were going into the business of selling
confectionery, as partners, and this form
of note was adopted to negative the suspicion that Mary was a mere surety for her
husband. Tate was aware, of the law
which renders a wife unable to be surety
for her husband, and, for this reason, declined to lend if she was such a surety.
The fact was that Charles intended alone
to begin the confectionery business and
that his wife was simply lending her
credit to him. This Tate did not know.
A few days after the loan was made,
Charles put out a sign in which he announced himself as sole conductor of the
business. Three days after this, Jacob
Tate sued the defendants.
CRARY and GERBER for the plaintiff.
A married woman's power to contract is
now so general that her inability is the exception rather than the rule. 154 Pa. 258;
161 Pa. 109.
When fraud has induced the making of
a contract the injured party may rescind.
Clark on Contracts, 848; 72 Pa. 4*27; 117
Mass. 23.
KEELER and EBBERT for the defendant.
A married woman is not liable in a note
if she signs it as an accommodation surety
for her husband. 181 Pa. 103; 165 Pa. 526;
15 Sup. 64.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

In the case at bar, the plaintiff seeks to
recover as damages, one thousand dollars,
for the breach of a contract.
The plaintiff was aware of the fact that
a wife could not act in the capacity of accommodation endorser or surety. By the
acts of 1887 and 1893, the restraints formerly put upon women by coverture were removed so that now a wife may do any act
unless expressly prohibited by statute
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She may become a partner in business
with her husband, but is prohibited from
acting as his surety.
Mrs. Wiley had moncy, orat least credit,
for it was only upon their.agreement to
enter into partnership, that the money
was loaned aind the notes, signed by both,.
accepted.
Tate absolutely refused to lend the
money if she was to act as surety, and it
was distintly understood and agreed
that the money was to be loaned to them
as partners and it was accordingly done.
The defendants contend that inasmuch
as the note was yet not due when sued
upon, that plaintiff's action must fail.
It is a cardinal rule of the law of contracts that where a contract is entered
into by one who is induced to enter by a
false or fraudulent representation of
another, that the party injured may sne
in deceit. If, however, the representation goes to the essence of the contract,
the injured party not only has a right to
an action in damages for a breach thereof,
but has also a right to rescind the contract
immediately upon discovering the breach.
In the present case the plaintiff was
duped and made to believe that he was
lending money to a partnership firm and
it was expressly agreed among the parties
to this contract that the defendants were
to receive this money only on condition
that they entered the business in partnership.
There is clearly a breach of this contract, and one which the court believes
goes to the very esence thereof.
Judgment must therefore be for the
plaintiff.
BOUTON, J.
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT.

The suit by Tate wasbrought, noton the
noteof the Wileys, buton a promise implied
because of the alleged invalidity of the contract with the plaintiff. The note had not
become due when the action was begun.
That action was premature unless the contract made was voidable by Tate, or was
void. His declaration ,,lleges that misrepresentations were made by Mrs. Wiley
and her husband, as to their relation as
co-principals,that he was deceived by them
into making the loan, that he therefore has
a right to rescind the contract, and at once

recover the money lent on an implied contract, and that, in the exercise of this
right, he rescinds and demands back his
money. A few principles will assist us to
a solution of the question whether suit on
such quasi-contract can be sustained.
It is clear that if the actual contract was
not void, nor voidable, the law will not
imply a different contract.
The suit
would need to be upon the note, and for
the purpose of enforcing it according to its
terms. Was it, then, either void or voidable?
The suggested reason for its voidness is,
that Mrs. Wiley, being a married woman,
her c(.ntract was, in fact, that of guarantor,
surety, accommodation eudbrseror maker.
We fail to find that this is its character.
On the face of the transaction. Mrs. Wiley
was the principal, and her husband the
collateral debtor. If we inquire into the
facts, we discover that they represented to
Tate that they were co-principals, and the
money borrowed was to be, every dollar of
it, the joint property of the two. It was
not the disclosed intention that, as soon as
the money was borrowed, one-half of it
should be hers and the other half his. Had
that been the case, Tate would have known
that as to half, Mrs. Wiley was becoming
accommodation maker for her husband.
The information actually given to him was
that they were joint borrowers, and were to
be joint owners of the money borrowed. If
that were true they would be, she as well
as he, liable for the whole sum and neither
would be surety for the other. Henry v.
Faust, 19 Pa. C. C. 495.
It is urged that the representation made
to Tate was not merely that the Wileys
were borrowing as co-principals, but that
they were borrowing as partners; that a
wife cannot become a partner with her
husband, and, therefore, that her contract,
as such, is void. It issufficient to remark
on this: (1) that the Wileys did not pretend
-to be partners and to borrow assuch. They
said that they "were going into the business of selling confectionery as partners."
They did not profe-s to have formed the
partnership. Ioney borrowed by a partner to be used in paying his contribution
to the partnership is not a firm debt. Nor
does money borrowed by two, jointly, to
be used by them in a partnership subsequently to be formed, become a firm debt.
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The Tate loan was not, in fact, to a firm.
There was none such in existence. Nor
was it believed or intended by him to be to
a firm. He knew that there was none
such yet in existence.
(2) Would the fact that Tate knew that
Mrs. Wiley intended to use. the money in
a firm makeit impossible for him to recover
it even if she could not validly make a
contract of partnership? We think not.
(3) But, it cannot be said with accuracy
that she could not make a contract of partnership. While, at common law, such a
contract would for some purposes not be enforced, for othere it would be entirely
valid. She could demand a share of the
profits. The money or other property
actually contributed by her to the firm
could be levied upon or otherwise appropriated by firm creditors.
(4) A married woman, since the act of
June 3d, 1887 and of 1893, is able to enter
into a partnership, and as a member thereof make notes which will bind her, Brooks
v. Merchants N. Bank, 125 Pa. 394; Loeb
v. Mellinger, 12 Super. 592. Of. Little v.
Hazlett, 197 Pa. .591. We are aware that
in some states, under statutes more or less
similar to those just referred to, it has been
held that a woman cannot form a partnership with her husband. We see no trace
of such a distinction in the act of 1893.
Her power to make post-nuptial contracts
affecting the property rights of herself and
husband has long been recognized. She
can loan money to her husband and recover
It from his estate. The fact that she could
not sue him in his lifetime has not been
thought to destroy the power to make the
contract. She can effectively waive the
right to interest on the money thus lent to
him. Marriage is itself a form of community of goods and other interests and to
allow to be coupled with it the mercantile
community offends no sound policy.
If, however, a woman cannot make a
partnership with her husband, and if, in
consequence, a note for a loan of money to
her and to him as partners or to be used by
them as partners, is not enforceable, it
would not follow that the money could be
recovered back by the lender. Money lent
to a minor could not be recovered on a
quasi-contract, because it could not be recovered on the contract. When money
was lent to a married woman in the period

of her contractual disability, it was never
understood that it could be recovered on
an implied contract. What could a minor
orfeme covert gain from refusing a future
recovery against him or her on the maturity of the bond or note, while allowing an
instant recovery? or by declining the execution oftheactual contract, while executing
an artificial quasi-contract just as onerous? The object of the contractual incapacity would have been frustrated by permitting recoveries on feigned contracts.
It is insisted, however, that although,
had the representations made by the
Wileys been true, Mrs. Wiley would have
been bound by the note, they were untrue
and that in fact she was lending her credit
to her husband. At common.law it was
held that a feme covert coilld not estop
herself by untrue representations which,
if true, would have shown that she had
capacity to contract, and that she would
not be liable in tort for their untruth,
Keen v. Hartman, 48 Pa. 497. The legislation of 1887 and 1893 has removed almost
all of her common law inability to contract. She cannot become an accommodation maker or endorser, a guarantor or
surety: 2 P. & L. 2890. Whether one is
becoming such depends on his contract
with the co-borrower, as well as his contract with the lender. The latter must
depend, in a large number of cases, for his
knowledge of the agreement between the
co-promisors, upon their own declarations.
In this case, Tate declined to lend until
he was assured by them that the borrowers
were co-principals. He could learn in no
other way. We think the act of assembly
contemplates that the lender may accept
the representations of the borrowers, and
that the risk is not put on him, of their
truth. In all the cases consulted in which
the wife's note has been held void because
she was a surety, the lender has known
the facts or should have suspected them
from the form of the transaction. To hold
that thevalidity of the transaction depends
on the truth of the representation would
be to give a married woman the borrowing
power, and yet seriously to embarrass its
exercise by making the lender's ability to
recover the money depend on facts concerning which she may deceive him, or
else to drive the lender to an action founded on a quasi-contract. To permit andre-
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quire the latter would make her contractual incapacity of no value at all to a
feme. We think, therefore, that Mrs.
Wiley's relation to her husband must, so
far as Tate is concerned, be taken to be that
which she induced him to believe it to be.
The conclusion we have reached is, that
the contract was valid and that its invalidity could be the only excuse and that
such invalidity would not be an excuse,
for resorting to a feigned contract, such as
the plaintiff has resorted to. The misrepresentations made were innocuous, for
they gave the same validity to the contract which the facts affirmed in them
would have given to it.
Judgment reversed.
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OPINION OF THE COURT.

The decedent took out an insurance
policy of $10,000 on his life, making it
payable to his brother. He requested his
brother to collect the money, and pay out
certain debts amounting to $14,000. He
owed certain other debts amounting to
$40,000, one of which was a debt of $5,000
owing to the plaintiff. This action was
brought to recover this debt of $5,000 from
the funds held by the brother, claiming
that he held the money for the benefit of
all creditors.
The point contended by the plaintiff is,
that this assignment inured to the benefit
of all creditors under the Act of June 4,
1901, which Act repealed the Act of April
17, 1834. This Act, prohibiting preferences in assignments, applies only to asGILPIN vs. HARRITY.
signments of property to which the debtor
has a right as owner, and over which he
Preference of creditors-Assignmentsfor can exercise control. The only property
benefit of creditors-Lifeinsurance.
of the decedent which entered into this
transaction was the sum represented by
this policy, over which the decedent had
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.
no ownership whatever. The case would
John Harrity took out a life insurance
policy on his own life, making it payable have been different if he had secured Into his brother, William He was not in- surance on his life in his own name, and
had then assigned the policy. Schaeffer's
debted to William, but his intention was
(and was communicated to William) that Estate, 194 Pa. 420.
The Act of 1901 only applies to assignWilliam should collect the money, and
ments for the benefit of all creditors, and
pay certain debts owing by John. These
therefore the case at bar does not come
debts amounted to $14,000. Besides these
under this Act. This was not an assigndebts, there were others amounting to
ment for benefit of creditors. A debtor
$40,000, among which was one of $5,000
may prefer a creditor. The law only proowing to John Gilpin. Gilpin, alleging
hibits preferences in an assignment for
that Harrity held the money for the benebenefit of all creditors. It is well estabfit of all creditors, brought this assumpsit
lished that a brother may take out an infor his share.
surance policy on his own life, and make
CANNON and COOPER for plaintiff.
it payable to his brother. Although it is
This is an assignment for the benefit of not clear that the deceased was insolvent,
creditors. McCutcheouns Appeal, 99 Pa.
137; 76 Pa. 52; 166 Pa. 134. As such, it but even if he had been, it does not warwas void, as it preferred certain creditors. rant the inference that the assignment
Act of June 4, 1901. Policy should have was in fraud of creditors. It may, notbeen delivered. 50 Pa. 75; 75 Pa. 115; 106 withstanding, have been made in good
Pa. 116. Brother had no insurable interfaith, and without fraud. Such a transfer
est. 112 Pa. 2.51.
of the benefits of a policy is not frauduldnt
LAUER and ScHAnz for defendant.
Policy was not assets ofdecedent's estate. as to creditors, neither can it be considered
McCutcheons Est., 99 Pa. 113; Com. v. a wagering contract. McCutcheon's Appeal, 99 Pa. 133.
Life Ins. Co., 117 Mass. 337; Tiedekin's
Est., 11 Phila. 95; 46 Mich. 429. Not an
A debtor may assign any part of his
assignment. Debtor could prefer cred- estate to certain creditors, or in trust for
itors. 2 Kent 532; 1 Binney 502; 16 Peters
104. Creditors preferred are entitled to them, if at the time of so doing he be soltheirdebt. Stokes v. Coffey, 4 Busk (Ky.) vent. Third section of Act, 1901, June 4th.
533; Page v. Bernstlne, 102 U. S. 644.
There is no evidence in this case as to the
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insolvency of deceased, and therefore we
cannot make an inference that such was
the case. William, to whom this policy
was made payable, was a trustee of the
creditors, whose debts the deceased had
requested him to pay. It is well established by numerous precedents in Pennsylvania that the execution of an insurance pohcy payable to a trustee of certain
creditors of the person whose life is insured, does not constitute an assignment
for benefit of creditors. Wallacev. Wainright, 87 Pa. 260; Dickson & Co. Assigned
Est., ]66 Pa. 134.
In view of these principles, verdict must
be entered for defendant.
WILLIAMSON, J.

TRUMBONE vs. MACE.
Filing transcriptof jud.qment obtained before a Justice of the Peace-Effect-Revivals by scire.facias-Acts of March 20,
1810; May 5, 1854; June 24, 1885.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

Trumbone recovered a judgment against
Mace, before a Justice of the Peace, January 1], 1889, but did nothing further until
Mace, having died in January, 1899, he
filed the transcript, of the judgment in the
Common Pleas in February, 1900, and in
May, 1901, issued sci fa thereupon to the
administrator of Mace, his widow and
children, with a view to issuing execution
and levying upon the land. The widow
and children defended that the debt had
lost its lien.
KLINE and MYERS for the plaintiff.
A transcript may be filed after five years
from the date of the rendition of the judgment without revival before the justice.
Sanders v. Mase, 4 Pa. C. C. 134; Diamond
v. Tobias, 12 Pa. 312.
PEIGHTEL and SCHEE for the defendant.
The judgment not having been revived
by sci fa within five years ceased to be a
lien on the estate of the decedent. Act
May 5, 1854; Smith v. Wehrley, 157 Pa.
407.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

The only point in this case is, has this
judgment lost its lien? By Act of Assembly, June 8, 1893, P. & L. Dig. 1433, section
I, it is provided that no debts ofa decedent
dying after the passage of this act, except
they be secured by judgment or mortgage,

shall remain a lien on the real estate of
such decedent longer than two years after
the decease of such debtor unless an action
for the recovery thereof be commenced
against his heirs, executors or administrators within the period of two years after
his decease, and duly prosecuted to judgment. After a careful cousideration of this
statute its provisions reveal that its chief
object and only effect is to reduce the duration of the lien to two years, in precisely
the same manner as the Act of May 5,
1854, which reduced the period from seven
to five years; Trover v. Ellenberger, 2 P.
& W. 95; Donegan's Estate, 82 Pa. 495.
The plaintiffis contention is, that this
lien is not dead, but that the mere.filing of
this transcript gives new life to it, which
has been dead more than six years. If
this be the case, then the plaintiff has a
remedy. But it is not a reasonable interpretation of the Act of 1834 to hold that
the legislature intended the creditor, by
the mere filing of this transcript, should
make a live judgment out of one already
dead for eleven years, Smith v. Wehrley,
157 Pa. 407.
Since. iu the case at bar, the plaintiff
failed to comply with the act of assembly
by not reviving the judgment by sci fa,
which is a substitute for an action on a
debt, until more than six years thereafter,
the court is of the opinion that the lien is
barred; Smith v. Wehrley, 157 Pa. 407.
Judgment for defendant.
G. S. MOWRY, J.
OPINION OF THE SUPERIOR COURT.

The judgment of the justice, rendered
January 11, 1889, was not transcripted into
the Common Pleas until February, 1900.
Meantime, in January, 1899, Mace, the defendant, had died. Had Mace not died,
was the transcript too late? The tenth
section of the Act of March 20, 1810, 1 P.
& L: 2585, authorizes the entry of transcripts by prothonotaries, but imposes no
limit of thne within which such entry can
be made. The first section of the Act of
May 5, 1854, 1 P. & L. 2591, prohibits The
issue of an execution by a justice after five
years from the rendering of the judgment,
unless there has been a revival of it by
scire facias or an amicable confession.
We are aware of no statute that prohibits
the transcribing after five or any other
greater number of years. In Sanders v"
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Mase, 4 Pa. C. C. 134, ajustice's judgment,
rendered April 20th, 1878, was transcripted
August 10, 1887. A ft. fa. returned no
goods, had issued May 10, 1878. McPherson, J. refused oi motion, to strike off the
transcript, on the ground that the judgment was more than five years old. In
Diamond v. Tobias; 12 Pa. 312, a judgment
nearly twenty years old was transcripted
into the Common Pleas. A rule to strike
off a transcript, entered March 8, 1882, of
a judgment rendered by a justice, January
13, 1872, on which a ft. fa. had issued
December 13, 1874, and been returned
nulla bona, was discharged in Wister v.
Carrigan, 12 W. N. C. 238; 3 Liens 551.
If payment has been made, or the judgment has been otherwise satisfied, the fact
can .be shown upon the scirefacciasthat
issues from the Common Pleas.
We are now to consider whether the
deas!h of Mace in January, 1899, made the
subsequent transcript improper.
Why
should it? It would b.- improper, only if
the objeot of tran.ceripting could no longer
be effected. That object is to obtain a lien
upon and satisfaction out of land. The
judgment, when in tie Common Pleas, becomes a lien, and sustains an execution in
the absence of personalty owned by the
defendant. A judgment transcripted has
"all the force and effects of a judgment
originally obtained in the court of Common Pleas of the county." Act June 24,
1885 ; 1 P. & L. 2584. It begins ordinarily
to be a lien on the day of its filing. If the
de.fendant is dead, the judgment does not
become a lien, but it will prolong the lien,
which is an incident to the debt. Tie
filing of the judgment is equivalent to the
bringing of an action, and the recovery of
a judgment against the administrator. A
judgment recovered before a justice, after
the death of the debtor, is sufficient to
prolong the lien when transcripted within the period during which the decedent's
debts are liens-2 Liens 526; a fortiori,one
recovered before his death, but transcripted after, but within the statutory
period.
The transcript was proper, despite the
intervening death of the defendant. The
lien of the debt, revived by the transcript,
continued for five years. The scirefacias
to revive it, although more than two
years after the death of the decedent, pro-
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longed the lien for five years from the date
of the filing of the transcript. It was error, therefore, for the learned court below
to hold that the debt had lost its lieu.
Judgment reversed with v.f. d. n.
ESTATE OF JOAQUIN MILLER.
Trusts- Unertainty of object- Void in
part-A-icnation of trust property.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

Miller idevised hisfairm to his son, John,
in trust for his two daughters, Rebecca
and Ruth, for their lives, but so that the
income should not be assignable in advance of its payment to them and so that
such income should not be attachable for
debts; and, after the death of the daughters, in further trust to convey it to a
society in the city established to give lectures in favor of the non-theistic origin of
the universe. Rebecca borrowed money
from Win. Pope, who obtained judgment
against her, attached half of the income
in the hands of John, alleging that the
trust for the society being void, the trust
for the daughters was likewise void, and
the funds in the trustee's hands were
therefore attachbble.
WALSH

and

WILLIAMSON

fortheplain-

tiff.
The trust in favor of the society is void
since its object is to promote atheism, infidelity, and immorality. 63 Pa. 465: 93
I'a. 165; 159 Pa. 500.
The trust in favor of the society being
yoid, it follows that the trust to the daughters is also at an end. Conly's estate, 197
Pa. 291; Dodson's appeal, 60 Pa. 492;
Nice's appeal, 50 Pa. 143.
WELSH and MYERS for the defendant.
This being a spendthrift trust, is not
subject to the claims of creditors. 77 Pa.
464; 198 Pa. 572.
The failure of the limitatio over to the
society does not affect the trust to the
daughters. Moore's estate, 198 Pa. 611;
105 N. Y. 134; 43 N. Y. 303.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

Is the trust to the daughters of Joaquin
Miller void because the subsequent trust
is void? That is the only point to be decided in the case at bar.
The testator died, leaving his farm to his
son, John, in trust for his two daughttrs for
life, and after their death, in further trust
to convey to a society established in the
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city, to give lectures on the non-theistic
origin of the universe.
Counsel for the
plaintiff contend that if the latter trust is
void the first will be void also. Trusts can
be created either by parol or by writing.
It therefore follows that a trust can be
created by a will, but to be valid, the will
must be duly executed. A writing which
purports to be a testamentary paper, if not
properly executed to take effect as a will,
cannot be relied upon as a memorandum
to satisfy the statute. Lewin on Trusts,
chapter 5, section 3.
Three things must concur to raise a trust,
first, sufficient words; second, a definite
suhject, and third, a certain and aseertained object, and to this may be added
another, viz: that the terms of the trust
should besuitciently declared. Bispham's
Equity, p. 103,sec. 65.
All this has been done; the testator in
very plain words said what he wanted
done with his property. It was an express, active trust if I may use the term.
It devolved upon the trustee duties which
he must perform; he must collect the income and distribute it among the cestues
que trust, and after their death to convey
to the society named. The trust in favor
of the daughters was legal, it was within
the power of the testator to limit his prol,erty as he did, and such a trust will be upheld. Ashurst v. Given, 5 W. & S. 323.
It has been attacked on the ground of
uncertainty also. It is a policy of the law
that it will not allow a trust to fail for want
of a trustee. The above is so well settled
that it needs no citation of authority. In
Conly's estate, 197 Pa. 290, a bequest was
made to the daughters and after their
death to charity. The court held that if
made within thirty days of death the
subsequent trust would have failed, and
the daughteis would take under the intestate laws. Everything in the present case
tends to show the will was valid, and the
trusts would be valid if they were of the
kind that the law sanctions.
The second trust is void. It would be
against public policy to allow such a trust
to be enforced; it would tend to create and
perpetuate societies against the Christian
side of life. It is true thatthe constitutions
both of the United States and of Pennsylvania allow no interference in the modeof
worshiping God in any manner that the

people see fit, but Atheism and Infidelism
lead to immorality and their attending
evils, and the law will not sanction anything that will promote a disregard of the
laws of the land. When there are no controlling influences of religion, we find discord and immorality stalkiug forth in its
grossest forms.
The Act of 1885 says, "no disposition of
property hereafter made for any religious,
charitable or scientific use, shall fail for
wantof a trustee, or by reason of the object
being uncertain, or ceasing or depending
upon the discretion of the last trustee, or
being in perpetuity or in excess of, the
annual value hereinbefore limited, but it
shall be the duty of the Orphans' Court,
or any court having equity jurisdiction
in the proper county to supply a trustee,
and by its decree to carry into effect the intent of the donor or testator so far as the
same can be carried into effect consistently
with law and equity." P. & L. 540, Sec. 5.
When trustsare created and those which
render the entire disposition illegal can
be separated, and the legal upheld without
doing injustice or defeating that which
the testator might be presumed to wish,
that which is illegal, or which added to
others renders the whole illegal, may be
cut off, and the intention of the testator
given effect so far as the statute will permit. Lewin on Trusts, 1-197; Moore's
Estate, 198 Pa. 611; Kennedy v. Hay, 105
N. Y. 134. The trust is void as to the
charitable bequest and valid as to the bequest to the daughters.
Judgment for defendants.
ALOYSIUS

C.

MCINTIRE, J.

THORPE vs. ADAMS.
Ancestral property-Estate by curtesyBight of lessee to set up superior titleAct April 8, 1833.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

John Jones acquired land, which, at his
death, passed to his brother, William. At
William's death it descended to his daughter, Jennie Adams. She dying, it descended to her daughter, Ann. At Ann's
death childles, her father, Benjamin
Adams, was alive, and a grandson of John
Jones,Thorpe, and two children of another
grandson, John Harper and Rebecca Harper. These had made a lease of the land
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to Benjamin Adams for his life, for the
nominal consideration of $5.00. The defendant defended in his own right, and as
lessee of John and Rebecca Harper, the
ejectment by Thorpe, and denied the title
of Thorpe.
CLAYCOMB and HOAGLAND for plaintiff.
The land should have passed to lineal
descendants instead of passing collaterally.
Act April 18, 1833.
The object of the system of descents is to
keep real property in the line of those who
acquired it. 7 S.& R. 379.
The tenant cannot dispute his landlord's
title. 4 S. & R. 467; 23 Pa. 131; 3 Watts
449.
HICKERNELL and Fox for defendant.
The defendant is not estopped from setting up his own right against lessor.
Moyer v. Thomas, 38 Pa. 426; Stingeon v.
Hustead, 198 Pa. 148.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

We are not enlightened in this case as to
the manner in which the land passed
from John Jones to his brother, William.
"Passed to" has no technical signification
in law, and we are not to presume a violation of the intestate act. William Jones
must have acquired the land by will, it
passing to him at the death of his brother
If there was no will, the property would
undoubtedly have passed to John Jones'
sons, or, if they were dead, to their children.
The title to the land, so far as the facts
show, was indisputably in William Jones.
He dying, it descended to his daughter,
Jennie Adams. At her death it descended
to her daughter, Ann. Ann died childless, but her father, Benjamin Adams,
survived. Benjamin Adams, the defendant, takes a life estate as tenant by the
curtesy in the lands of his wife, this being
guaranteed to him by the Act of April 8,
1833, P. & L., vol. 1, col. 2408, and Act of
April 11, 1848. Benjamin Adams now has
a life estate. Furthermore, under the Act
of April 8, 1833, he is entitled to a life
estate in the property of his daughter,
who died childless. Thus he has a double
life estate, paradoxical as that may seem.
He is prevented from inheriting a fee from
his daughter by the fact that he is not of
the blood of the ancestor from whom the
estate descended, the intestate act enforcing this prohibition. This, however, does
not affect his life estate. 38 Pa. 426; 198
Pa. 148. Having found in .the defendant
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a right to a life estate, incontestible by the
plaintiff, let us turn to his other contention. What is his claim to present possession? We have dismissed his allegation concerning the irregular and unlawful turn of descent from the lineal to the
collateral line at the death of John Jones
as not sustained by the facts. Did the
fact that the defendant accepted what is
called a lease from John and Rebecca Harper put him in the category of a tenant,
and within the rule that a tenant cannot
set up a superior title against his landlord? We may waive the question
whether the lease from John and Rebecca
Harper bound William Thorpe, and made
him a party to the lease. In the fee, after
the life estate, they are tenants in common.
We hold the defendant is not estopped
from setting up his right against John and
Rebecca Harper, and a fortiori against the
plaintiff. The defendant did not enter
under plaintiff, and never made himself a
tenant in fact. In 20 W. N. C. 50, the
Court says: "If one in possession of land
under claim of title is induced to accept a
lease through misrepresentation, fraud or
trick, or through mutual mistake of fact of
both parties, the lessee is not subsequently
estopped from setting up title in himself
superior to the landlord." This so-called
lease was made clearly as a release, the
consideration being nominal, and it was
no doubt intended to assure the defendant
that he would not be disturbed by the
Harpers, even if they had rights antagonistic to him. In any view the defendant
is not estopped, and the plaintiff must fail.
Judgment is therefore entered for defendant.
T. A. DONAHOE, J.
ESTATE OF WA. HOLMES.
Parent and child-Contract for services
-Rule of certainty.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On the death of Win. Holmes, his son,
James, claimed $20,000. Several witnesses
testified that James, who had been at
work for his father, expressed the intention to go away unless there was some
arrangement made to compensate him,
that the father asked him to continue in
his service saying he would leave him
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enough at his death to keep him for his
lifetime. James therefore continued for
two years to serve his father. The proper
salary for him would be $900 a year. He
had been working two years before the
contract was made. The auditor allowed
James the sum of $14,000, on the theory
that at five )ercent. thatsum would yield
S700 annually-a sum sufficient to "keep"
James. The other distributees except.
MINNIcH and TURNER for the exceptants.
The evidence was not direct and positive and the allowance was, in any case,
excessive. Bash v. Bash 9 Pa. 260; 12
Pa. 175; 25 Pa. 308; 56 Pa. 395.
STERRETT and CONRY for the defendant.

A valid contract existed between the
father and son. Harper's estate, 196 Pa.
137; Kauss v. Rhoner, 172 Pa, 481.
The contract was sufficiently definite.
Thompson v. Stevens, 71 Pa. 169.
There was sufficient evidence to establish the claim. Harrington v. Heckman,
148 Pa. 401; Harper's estate, 196 Pa. 137.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

JOHN COLGAN vs. WILLIAM HERRON.
Agreement to assume payment of mortgage- General indemnity -R ight of
covenantee, who is also executor, to sue
on the contract.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

John Colgan sold land to Herron, subject to a mortgage of $3000. Herron agreed
to pay the mortgage and S1500 additional.
He paid the $1500, but not the mortgage ;
thereupon the mortgagee entered a judgment on the accompanying bond against
Colgan, and threatened to issue an execution on it, if it should not be paid in
three months. Meantime, the mortgagee,
who was Colgan's father, died, leaving
Colgan, the only legatee and executor.
This action was against Herron, on his
contract. One defence was, that Co!gan
had not yet been compelled to pay, and
had not paid the judgment, and that the
action should be on the mortgage, by Colgan, as executor.
M KEEHAN

There can be no doubt that a contract
was made between James Holmes and his
father. But the words must show the undertaking was certain in order to be enforceable.
The contract, according to the testimony
of many witnesses, was that "if he (the
son) would continue in his service, he
would leave him enough at his death to
keep him for his life." Here, then, is a
measure by which the amount can be ascertained, and which brings the case within the rule of certainty.
The son's condition in life being taken
into consideration, it would not be a difficult matter to determine definitely what
sum would be sufficient for his support.
Thompson v. Stephens, 71 Pa. 161.
The auditor awarded the sum of $14,000
on the theory that at 5 per cent. that sum
would yield $700 a year. This sum, according to the terms of the contract, was
not excessive as is contended by the distributees.
Harper's estate, 196 Pa. 137, is analagous
to the case at bar. There the claimant
was allowed to recover.
Exceptions dismissed.
R.

K.

MACCONNELL, J.

and

THORNE

for the plain-

tiff.
An agreement to assume the payment
of a mortgage is a promise of general indemnity. Blood v. Crew Levick Company, 171 Pa. 328.
A promise of general indemnity is
broken by the recovery of a judgment
against the person, to whom the promise
was made; and, he may sustain an action
upon it, without proof of the payment of
the judgment. Stroh v. Kimmel,8 Watts
157; McAbee v. Cribbs, 194 Pa. 94: Brainford v. Keefer, 68 Pa. 389.
Colgan, as vendor, was the covenantee;
as executor, he is entitled to receive the
money. Therefore, the rights of allinterested parties being centered in him, he
his right to sue on the contract. Ardesco
Oil Company v. North American Oil Company, 66 Pa. 375; Taylor v. Preston, 70
Pa. 463; Merriman v. Moore, 90 Pa. 78.
RHODES, J., and LOGAN for the defendant.
An action must be brought for the use
of the'party entitled. Blood v. Levick
Company, 171 Pa. 328; Kearney v. Tanner, 17 S. & R. 94; Hirst's Appeal, 92 Pa.
491.
The proper action is for the plaintiff, as
executor, to foreclose the mortgage. Robens v. Marlatt, 136 Pa, 35.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

This action has been brouglht by John
Colgan against Herron, to recover the
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amount still unpaid on the contract for
as the "under and subject" clause in the
the sale of the land.
deed is concerned, no liability has sprung
The contract itself has not been imup, for the covenantimp'ied in that clause
peaclied. What reason can be given that
is to indemnify the rantor to the extent to
he should not recover whatever money
which he may be compelled to pay the
there may be due him thereon, according
debt. The implied covenant is not broken
to the terms of the contract ?
prior to such payment or to a judicial sale
If John Colgan, at any time, subseof the mortgaged premises leaving a porquently to the sale to Herron, had paid
tion of tie debt unpaid. Blood v. Crew
the mortgage, can there be any doubt
Levick Co., 171 Pa. 328; McAbee v. Cribbs
that Herron could be compelled in an
194 Pa. 94.
action to reimburse him for such payment,
But the express ,ver arit to pay the
or that Herron was morally bound to remortgage is, it seems, interpreted differimburse him ?
ently. It is treated as a covenant to nay
How does the death of the mortgagee and
to the grantor whatever he may, by a
the devolution of all the mortgagee's injudgment against him at the suit of the
terest on John Colgan change the situmortgagee, be ascertained to be liable to
ation? This cannot change the conpay to the latter. Time grantor does not
tractual relation existing between John
need to have paid this judgment before he
Colgan and Herron. If the elder Colgan
can resort to an action oi the covenant.
had died insolvent, or indebted to an exMcAbee v. Cribbs, 194 Pa. 94. Indeed,
tent that would give his creditors the
there are. cases which hold the recovery,
right to look to John Colgan, as the debtor
of ajudgment by the creditors, against the
of his father, for the payment of a portion
indemnifiedperson, unnecessary before the
of his indebtedness to the estate of his
latter brings a suit on the promise of infather, it would hardly be contendedthat
demnity. Ardesco Oil Co. v. Oil & Mining
whatever he might be compelled to pay
Co., 66 Pa. 375.
his father's creditors would measure seriThe elder Colgan, the mortgagee, had
ous liability to him. What conceivable
entered a judgment on the bond, against
condition, of the elder Colgan's estate can
the younger Colgan, before the latter
change Herron's liability to him? It was
brought this suit. The suit was, theresimply to pay to John Colgan, or to pay
$4,500. The contracting parties alone are fore, not premature.
Before the suit was begun, however, the
competent to change the contract, and it
mortgagee died, and the mortgagor, his
requires their concurrent action to do this.
son, became his executor and only legatee.
Colgan's failure to pay the incumbrance
Colgan, Jr., combined now in his own
on the farm which Herron's contract
person two rights, that of the mortgagee,
bound him to pay can in no way change
his creditor, and that of the covenantee in
the relation existing between John Colgan
his deed to Herron. But though these
and Herron and this is clearly shown by
the case of Stroh v. Kimmel, 8 Watts 159; rights were combined they remained distinct. The right of the covenantee was
McAbee v. Cribbs, 194 Pa. 94, and a long
not merged in that of the mortgagee, nor
list of similar cases.
the right of the mortgagee in that of the
Judgment is hereby entered in favor of
covenantee.
John Colgan, the plaintiff, and against
Perhaps, although a judgment against
Herron, the defendant, for the sum of
the
party indemnified, the cov.enantee, by
$3000, with interest from the date of the
his creditor, fixes the liability of the indem.contract.
nitor, the grantee, any event discharging
FRANK CONRY, J.
the covenantee. on paying less than the
OPINION OF SUPREME COURT.
whole debt, would pro tanto reduce the
When Colgan, Jr., conveyed the land to
amount recoverable from the indemnitor,
Herron, thee was a mortgage upon it, due
Bramford v. Keefer, 68 Pa. 389, where it
to the elder Colgan. The deed was subject
is assumed that the discharge of the covto this mortgage and it also contained a
enantee, after arrest on a capias ad satispromise to pay the mortgage. The mort- faciendum, would discharge him from the
gage has not been foreclosed, and, so far
liability to pay the judgment, and, there-
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fore, discharge the indemnitor from liabilPENISTON'S ESTATE.
ity to pay him theamount of thejudgment.
In the case before us, nothing has hap- Executors and administrators-Advancements by executor from his own funds
pened to produce a total or partial disfor payment of debts-Claim for reimcharge of the covenantee, the younger
bursement-STatuteof limitations.
Colgan.
It is true that he now represents the
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.
mortgagee, but so far as appears, hp must
as executor, compel himself, as obligor on
Peniston diedi insolvent owning a farm,
the bond, to pay it. There maybe credit- on which he owed several notes for purors whose debts require the payment. But
chase money. His executor, Jacob Lamb,
even if there were no debts, we should be
from his own funds paid some of these
unable to hold that Colgan, Jr., could not, notes, amounting to $3000, and sometime
as executor, compel himself, asindividual,
afterward, died, having filed no account.
to pay the bond. He would not be An administrator d. b. n. was appointed,
obliged to refrain from doing so, for the
who, four years after, filed a. account as
benefit of Herron, It would be to his inexecutor. In the account lie was credited
terest, as against Herron, to pay himself
with payments of the notes made from
as executor, and we must presume that he
seven to ten years before the account was
has done so. We dispose of the case as if
filed. The Orphans' Court affirmed, the
Colgan, obligor, had paid Colgan, or was
credits. On a distribution of the fund in
going to pay the executor of the obligee. The
the hands of the administrator d. b. n. a
mere fact that, if there are no creditors,
claim was made for the balance, which
there is nobody who could issue an execuwas rejected because more than six years
tion on the judgementon the bond, except
had elapsed since the respective payColgan himself, and nobody who, in the
ments.
orphans' court couldcompel him toaccount
The administrator d. b. n. had meanfor it, does not inure to the advantage of
time asked the court for leave to sell the
Herron.
land of decedent to pay debts. These
The covenant, though made with Col- debts were the notes paid by Lamb.
gan, Jr., was to pay a sum of money to
The court dismissed the petition beColgan, Sr. The latter could have brought
canse the debts had lost their lien. Apa suit on it to his use in the name of Colpeal.
gan, Jr. Blood v. Crew Levick Co., 171
THORNE and WILLIAMSON for the
Pa. 342. We may treat the action as thus plaintiff.
An executor, who advances his own
brought to the use of the younger Colgan
money for the payment of debts of his tesas executor.
tator. is entitled to reimbursement, at
The fact that Colgan, Jr., as executor of whatever lapse of time after testator's
the decedent, might have brought an ac- death. Wallace's Appeal, 5 Pa. 103; Trickett on Liens, Vol. ixi 527.
tion on the mortgage and sold the premises,
doesnot preclude the action which he has
LONERGAN and CRARY for the defenchosen tobring. His right as covenantee,
dant.
to sue for himself or for the use of himself
An executor, who makes himself a credas executor, is not taken away, because, as
itor by the advancement of his own money
to pay debts, cannot place himself'in a
executor, he has a very different right.
better situation than the other creditors.
On the mortgage, lie could sell only the
To preserve the lien, he must have repremises mortgaged. On the judgment
vived them as provided by the Acts of
in the personal action, he can sell any
Assembly. Loomis' Appeal, 59 Pa. 237;
property belonging to Herron, including
McCurdy's Appeal, 5 W. & S. 399; Merkel's Estate. 154 Pa. 285; Acts of February
the premises.
24, 1834 and June 8, 1893.
Judgment affirmed.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

The question before the court is, has an
administrator a right to make advancements and have these advancemepts preserved as a lien after the statutory period
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has elapsed. We think not. Anadmin- the death of the testator, the claim is no
istrator who advances his own funds to longer a lien against the estate. The
pay off debts of a decedent, does not there- Orphans' Court was correct when it reby extend the lien, or thereby place him- fused to grant the petition for a sale of
self in a better position than the other land since the debts have lost their liens.
creditors. The doctrine is held in 154 Pa. The appeal from the decree of the Orphans'
285, Merkel's Appeal. In order to extend Court is dismissed.
J. 0. ADAMSON, J.
the lien, he must issue a writ of 8aire
OPINION OF SUPERIOR COURT.
facias, Act ofFebruary 24,1834. Although
he has the right to pay the debts out of
The principles Involved in this case seem
his own fund, he need not do it. He can to have been misapprehended both by the
compel the creditors to take the statutory learned court below and by the counsel.
proceedings to have the debt paid by pe- Lamb, the executor of Peniston, paid,
titioning for a sale, or may, within the with his own money, certain debts of
limited time, have it done for himself. Peniston amounting to $3000. He died
As was said in 5 W. & S. 399, McCurdy's
having filed no account. His adminisAppeal, it would be going a great way in
trator, however, filed the account In
allowing the administrator to preserve the which he asked credit for the $3000, paid
debts against the estate, by paying these from seven to ten years before the account
debts out of .his own funds and have the was filed and the credit was allowed.
debts a lien for an indefinite period. The Four years after Peniston's death, his adAct of 1893 specifically makes all contract ministrator d. b. n. filed his account, and,
debts a lieu for two years only, unless by
in the distribution of the balance, Lamb's
waiver of the heirs, or the method pre- administrator claimed the $3000. This
scribed is adopted. It would be defeating
claim was refused because more than six
the one object for which administrators years had elapsed since Lamb's payare appointed, that of having an imme- ments.
diate settlement of the estate, so the heirs
The claim was against the personal
may know what amount of the decedent's fund, and the liability of Peniston's
estateis left to them. In Loomis' Estate land was not involved. The court below
it was held that fo perpetuate the lien of a was evidently right in holding, that the
simple contract debt against the real es- debts of Peniston had lost their lien on
tate of a decedent, some steps must be his land, because the lien of non-record
taken to revive the lien. Lying by with- debts does not continue longer than two
out action for twelve years discharges the years, unless prolonged by an action
lien. In Battersby v. Casion, it was held, against the administrator. As against the
that the confirmation of an account does personal fund, there is no obstacle to the
establish the debt, but it does not extend right of payment, except that offered by
the lien, or create a lien if the debt has the statute of limitations. When Lamb
been lost by the expiration of the time al- paid the notes, they were not barrefl by
lowed by the statute. The existence of the statute. When his administrator
the debt and the liability of the land for claimed reimbursement from Peniston's
it, are distinct matters. If the debt was estate, they would have been barred, had
lost before adjudication of the account and
they not been paid. Does the statute of
filing, the adjudication did not charge the limitations stop running when the exeland with it. In Smith v. Wildman, 178 cutor pays a debt, as against his right to
Pa. 245, where the lien of debts of a de- reimbursement, or does it continue to run
cedent has expired by the limitation pre- against him precisely as It would have run
sented by the statute, the Orphans' Court
against the original creditor? This Interhas no jurisdiction to direct the executor esting question the learned court below
or administrator to sue thg real estate for has not considered, while it has failed to
the payment of such debts when the per- allow Lamb's administrator to receive
payment of the $3000 advanced.
sonalty is insufficient.
The administrator having made the adHad the administrator paid the debt,
vancementsand allowing his claim against out of the decedent's assets, he would have
the estate to run morethantwoyearsfrom
been entitled to credit for the payment,
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when he or his administrator subsequently
settled the account. When he paid it out
of his own funds, he did notsimply become
subrogated to the creditor. He, as executor, was bound to file an account, and
in an account filed at any distance of
time he could claim credit for the payments made, and if they were, when
made, properly made, he would be entitled to the credit. The account in this
case was filed by Lamb's administrator,
and the credit claimed in it was properly
allowed. At least six years would be
allowed, after the adjudication on this ac.
count, for the presentation of a demand,
founded on it, against Peniston's estate in
the hands of his administrator d. b. n. It
was error, then, not to allow to Lamb's
administrator $300) out of the balance
shown in the account of Peniston's administrator d. b. n.
Decree reversed.
TIMMONS vs. HALLAM.
Ejectment- Construction of wilqs-Contingent remainder-Rulein Shelly's case.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

John Timmons left a will devising
his farm to his son, Jacob, for life, "and
after his death to his heirs, if he should
have no son living at the time of his
death." Jacob executed a deed in fee for
the land to George Hallam, but at his death
which followed the conveyance left to survive him a son, Peter, and a daughter,
Sarah. This ejectment was brought by
them against Hallam, who had been in
possession twelve years.
VASTINE and WELSH for the plaintiff.

The birth of ason defeated thejoinder
of the life estate with the renminder;
Jacob only took a life estate. Paxson v.
Leffert, 3 Rawle 59; Physick's Appeal, 50
Pa. 128; Heister v. Yerger, 166 Pa. 44.5;
Criswell v. GrumbiTng, 107 Pa. 408 ; Eby
v. Shank, 196 Pa. 426.
The intention that if Jacob had a son
living at the time of his death. the sol)
should take the remainder is evident, and
should be followed. Tbrar v. Herzog. ii
Sup. 51; Lancaster v. Flowers, 198 Pa.
614.
WRIGHT and Mowrvy for the defendant.
The rule in Shelly's case applies, the estate in Jacob was enlarged into a fee. and
his grantee acquired a good title. Potts'
Appeal, 30 Pa. 170; Brinton v. Martin,

197 Pa. 615; Stouch v. Zeigler, 196 Pa.
489.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

The defendant in this ejectment claims
by virtue of the devise to lgis vendor,
Jacob Timmons, "for life, and after his
death to his heirs, if he should have no
son living at the time of his death." He
maintains that he derived a good title
from Jacob. since the Rule in Shelly's
case converted Jacob's life estate, with remainder to his heirs into a fee simple.
Counsel for the plaintiffs deny the validity of Jacob's deed to Hallam in fee, and
claim that he, at best, had only a life estate, and that the rule in Shelly's case
did not apply. They tacitly admit that
it would apply, if it were not for the presenceof the clause "if he should have no
son living at the time of his death." The
question for this court to determine is,
whether that clause took this case out of
the Rule in Shelly's case, and, consequently whether Jacob had a fee.
The primaly and controlling rule in the
construction of wills is that the intention
of the testator must prevail. What is this
intention? How are we to discovpr it?
These are two vital questions in this case.
Judge Mitchell, in Tyson's Estate, 191 Pa.
218, defines intention thus : "his actual,
personal, individual intent; not a mere
conventional intent inferred from the use
of a set phrase or familiar form of words."
"In doubtful cases the courts favor that
construction, which, with the words of
the instrument, will give an absolute,
rather than a defeasible estate; a vested,
rather than a contingent one, and which
will result in a disposition in conformity
to the general rules of inheritance, rather
than that which will disinherit the heir
at law: "Thrane v. Hertzog, 12 Sup. 551.
Thus we must be careful of the manner in
which we interpret this devise to Jacob;
for, if we interpret it as the plaintiffi desire us to do, we shall be reducing Jacob's
estate from a fee to a life estate.
But the limitation in this case is too
plainly defined to be easily misunderstood.
It is to Jacob, for life, and, after his death
to his heirs, if he (Jacob) have no son living at his death. The counsel for the
plaintiffs contend that this is an implied
devise to Jacob's son. We are inclined to
regard this as the only plausible and cor-
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rect interpretation of the will.

Bigelow

on Wills says: "An estate may be created
by implication, without an express word
of gift. Intention to create must of course
appear on the face of the will." P. 302.
The testator's intention is very clear here.
What was the purpose of the insertion of
that clause "if he have no son living at his
death, unless he meant that that son was
to take the land at his father's death?
The only other possible inference is, that
the testator, by thus mentioning Jacob's
son, wished to exclude him from ththeirs. But, this interpretation is strained.
and is repugnant to the rule that the
courts are careful not to disinherit an
heir. The son would be a direct, and most
likely, sole heir.
So that, taking the will to intend a
devise in remainder to Jacob's son, if he
have one living at his death, we find the
case at bar to be ruled by a long line of
cases, of which we will take brief notice.
Judge Sergeant in Stewart v. Kenower, 7
W. & S. 288, held that where a testator
devised land "to his son forlife, and at his
death to his children and their heirs, if
he have any; if not, to his heirs in fee
simple," that in such a case, the rule in
Shelly's case would apply, and give the
son an estate in fee simple. "As, however, it was liable to be defeated by his
dying and leaving children, the union (of
the two estates) was not absolute, but sub
modo, so as to open when that event (existence of children at son's death) occurred.
That event never having occurred, his estate continued." In the case at bar the
event occurred-there was a son living at
death of .Jacol).
In Physick's Appeal.50 Pa. 128, where a
testator gave to his nephew as cestui que
trust (which estate was executed by the
statute of uses) an estate for life with
power of appointment at his death, and
in default of such Lppointment to his
(nephew's) heirs, the court held that the
nephew took all estate in fee simple. "It
cannot be overlooked that the dispositions
of the renainder after the gift of the particular estate for life are alternate limitations. One cannot help the other. If
no appollitnlent was made, the will was
to be read as if it contained no power of
appointment" No appointment was made.
In Melsheimer v. Gross, 58 Pa. 412, an
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estate for life was granted to J. Gross and
wife, and. "if they died without children,
issue of their or either of their bodies, to
their heirs and assigns forever; or if they
leave such iisue, then to such children,
their heirs and assigns." Gross attempted
to convey in fee simple, and it was held
that there was a limitation for life, with
remainder in fee (to issue) to be satisfied
before the third limitation (to heirs) can
take effect at all, and unless that (third
limitation) takes effect, there is no remainder to the heirs of the first taker to
unite with the estate for life. And in a
very late case, reported in 196 Pa. 426,
Eby v. Shank, the precedent is plainly
formed for this case, in hand. There the
testator devised land to his son, for life,
and if he have no son living at his death,
then to his heirs and legal representatives.
The son died, leaving no son. The court
held that the rule in Shelly's case applied. But the case, without directly asserting it, is nevertheless authority for the
doctrine that if there was a son living at
devisee's death, the fee simple would
open.
So that, from this line of ably decided
cases, we are enabled to decide the present
case. The rule in Shelly's case does apply,
giving Jacob a fee, subject to be opened on
his dying with a son living at his death.
This event happening, Jacob's fee is
opened and the son takes his contingent.
remainder. The limitation to the heirs
falls.
The existence of the clause "if he have
no son living at his death," does not withdraw the case from the rule in Shelly's
c ase, for, says Judge Sharswood in Klepner v. Laverty, 70 Pa. 70: "It is a rule of
law, which declares inexorably that where
the ancestor takes the preceding freehold

by the same instrument, whether a deed
or will, a remainder shall not be limited
to his heirs as purchasers." Also see
Eichelberger v. Barnitz. 7 Watts477. Nor
does the fact that the life estate, is expressly so limited, have any effect upon
the application of the rule: Paxson v. Leffert, 3 Rawle, 58, Physick's Appeal, 50 Pa.
128.
The counsel for the plaintiff request that
the name of Sarah Trimmons be stricken
from the record as one of the plaintiffs.
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This being a common method of procedure, the court is willing to allow it.
Therefore, as the case stands, the defendant has no title, and judgment must
be entered for the plaintiffs.
WALTER L.

SCHANZ, J.

OPINION OF SUPREME COURT.

The devise was to Jacob for life, and after
his death to his heirs, if he should have
no son living at the time of his death. The
rule in Shelly's case unites the estate in
the heirs to the estate for life in Jacob, and
confers on him a fee simple.
But the gift to the heirs is contingent
on the non-existence of sons. If sons are
in exi.tence, it does not take effect. It
has happened that Jacob has left a son,
Peter, and a daughter, Sarah. The contingency on which the devise over to heirs
is made, has therefore, not been fulfilled.
Hence that devise over does not operate,
and Jacob's estate remains but a life estate.
The grant to Hallam by Trimmons has
become ineffectual. Eby v. Shank, 196
Pa. 426.
. But, a plaintiff in ejectment recovers, if
at all, because of the strength of his own
title, not because of the feebleness of the
title of the defendant. The will contains
no express desire, in case of the survival
of ason. The learned courtbelow did not
hence infer that the testator died intestate
as to the reversion after what was practically Jacob's life estate, but intimates
that there is a devise by implication to tie
sons living at Jacob's death. In this
opinion we concur. The one son, Peter
accordingly takes the remainder.
We see no error in allowing the record
to be so awarded as to make Peter Trimmons, the sole plaintiff, and the declaration to claim for him the entire land.
Judgment affirmed.

STROUD vs. LINCOLN.
Partialpayment of an undisputed debt.
Conclusiveness of a receipt in full.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

Stroud had done mason work for Lin
coin and claimed $487, as the agreed upon
compensation. Lincoln denied that he
owed more than $350, and offered to pay
that amount for a receipt in full of all demands which he wrote and requested

Stroud to sign. rtroud was in great need
of money that day, and, in order to get
the $350 he signed the receipt, saying that
he should insist on the payment of the remaining $87. In assumpsit for the $87,
Lincoln defends by the receipt.
BISHOP and DONAHOE for the plaintiff.
A receipt in full of all demands is not
conclusive. It will be overcome by evidence establishing fraud, accident or mistake. Harris v. Hay, III Pa. 562; Shoemaker v. Steles, 102 Pa. 549; McDonal v.
Piper, 193 Pa. 312.
STAUFFER and DELANEY, LERoY, for
the defendant.
A receipt in full is always primafacie
evidence of a regular paymet. The case
discloses neither fraud, accident or mistake, in the absence of which, the receipt
is conclusive. Harris v. Hay, Ill Pa 662;
Johnston v. Scott, 11 Mich. 562; Langdon
v. Langdon, 4 Gray 186.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

In this case Stroud claims from Lincoln
for $437 as compensation for mason work
done by him for Lincoln. Lincoln claims
that$350 is the amount that he owes Stroud
for said work and presents a receipt in full
for that amount saying, that if he, Stroud,
will sign it, he, Lincoln, will pay him that
amount. Stroud, being in need of money,
signs the receipt but says he will insist on
the balance ot the amount that he claims.
In this case we have on the one hand the
testimony of Stroud that Lincoln owes him
$q7 more than the receipt calls for and on
the other hand we have the testimony of
Lincoln and the receipt in full that $350 is
the amount that Lincoln owed Stroud. A
receipt in full is not conclusive and is open
to explanation, but where there is no explanatory testimony it has a defined legal
meaning. While a receipt in full is not
conclusive yet it is primafacie evidence of
a settlement and should only be set aside
for weighty reasons. Rhodes Estate, 189
Pa. 460; Flynn v. Hurlock, 194 Pa. 462.
Therefore we are of opinion in this ease
that upon the testimony, the receipt in full
which the. plaintiff gave to the defendant
precludes him from any further recovery.
He gave this receipt because the defendant
claimed that this amount was all that he
owed him and because defendant refused
to pay him unless he signed this feceipt in
full. He could see, and must have known,
what he was signing, therefore, there was
no fraud, error, or imposition practiced
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him and he is consequently bound
upon
by it.
EBBERT,

J.

OPINION OF SUPREME COURT.

We are unable-to reach the conclusion

attained by the learned court below in
this case. There was evidence before the
court, not only that Stroud claimed
$437, but that that was the compensation
that had been agreed uppn. At the demand for pay, it is true that Lincoln denied that lie owed more than $350, and
that he paid that sum, for a receipt in full
of all demands, which he wrote, and requested Stroud to sign. But although
Stroud signed it, he, at the same time,
said that he should insist on the payment
of the remaining $87.
Had there ever been an agreement to
accept $350 in full payment of a debt of
$437, and had the $350 been paid, in pursuance of that agreement, the creditor
could have changed his mind, and insisted
on the payment of the $87 additional.
Mechanics' Bank v. Huston, 11 W. N. C.
389. A partial payment of an undisputed
debt is no consideration for a promise not
to demand the balance.
If the debt had been disputed, and the
parties had compromised agreeing, one to
pay, and the other to receive $350, the
compromise would have been irreversible.
But there was no compromise. Stroud insisted to the last, that the debt was $437,
and, even when he signed the receipt, declared that he should require the payment
of the remaining$87. Where, then, was
the compromise? A compromise is an
agreement. Where the latter is not, there
cannot be the former.
The only question is whether, one signing a receipt in full is bound by its terms,
although at the same time, he orally declared to the receiptee that it was not in
full. Such a receipt is, of courte, prima
facie evidence of a settlement between the
p arties. Rhoads' Estate, 189Pa. 460; Maconald v. Piper, 193 Pa. 312, and if the
receipt was not qualified by the evidence
of other facts occurring at the same time,
it might be conclusive ofasettlementthen
made, and of the payment by the defendant on the condition of its finality. But,
the evidence before the court not only
tended to show, but proved, that theacceptance of $350 was not intended by
Stroud, nor understood by Lincoln to he
intended by Stroud to be a finality. If
Lincoln was unwilling to pay $350 except
as a final payment, he ought to have declined to pay at all until Stroud consented
Lincoln evidently paid
to so accept it.
In the expectation of using the receipt for
a purose for which he knew that it was
not given him; that is. to prove that
Stroud had accepted the$350 in full. when
he had not so accepted it. To use it thus,
Is a fraud in him; Stroud's denial that it
was what it seems, is not fraud, but the
truth.
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We are aware that in Flynn v. Hurlock,
194 Pa. 462, words are used that imply
that such a receipt is unsusceptible of contradiction by the giver of it. In that case
however, the plaintiff had sent his bill for
$399U.50 for work and material. He subsequently called on defendant, and requested payment of that bill. Defendant
wrote on the foot of it "received payment
in full of all demands," and offered to pay
the bill, on the signing of the receipt.
Plaintiff signed the receipt, and accepted
the money, stating that "he waived no
right." He did not claim more than his
bill. The defendant was requiring no reduction of it. The court said that "on the
testimony in this case" the receipt precluded the plaintiff from the recovery of
more money.
Upon the facts ascertained in the case
before us, we think the receipt was not a
bar to the recovery of the $87. The evidence to prove the correctness of the plaintiff's claim for $437 ought to have been submitted to the jury.
Judgment re.versed with v. f. d. n.
DUBOIS BOROUGH vs. TELEGRAPH
COMPANY.
Borough ordinances-Taxation of telegraphpoles and wire.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

The borough imposed a license fee of$10
per six months for each pple and a like fee
of $10 per six months on each mile of wire
in the borough. After the line was in operation six months an ordinancewas passed
making the pole fee $20 per six'nonths and
the fee for each mile of wire, $25 per six
months. No other telegraph company was
in the borough, and the ordinance named
the defendant company specifically and
was applicable to no other. In assumpsit
by the borough for the fees for 18 months
on 60 poles and 5 miles of wire, thelegality
of the ordinance was denied by the company.
DEVER

and

CANNON

for the plaintiff.

The authority to make such ordinances
as shall be deemed necessary for the good
order and government of the borough is expressly given by the Act of April 3, 1851.
The ordinance was reasonable.
COOPER and DELANEY, L. for the defendant.
The borough authorities had no power to
tax tne poles and wires. As a police regulation their action cannot be sustained,because of the unreasonableness of the
charges imposed. Trickett's Borough Law,
vol 2, 43; New Hope v. Telegraph Co., 16
Sup., 306; Taylor Bros. v. Telegraph Co.,
16 Sup., 344; Telegraph Co. v. Phila., 22
W. N. C. 39; Chester v. Western Union
Tel. Co., 154 Pa. 466.
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OPINION OF THE COURT.

This case is an action of assumpsit
growing out of the refusal of the Telegraph
Company, to pay eighteen months rent on
60 poles and 5 miles of wire. The Borough passed an ordinance imposing a license fee of $10 per 6 months on each pole
of the company's and $10 per 6 months
for each mile of wire. Another ordinance
was passed 6 months later making the fee

for eauih pole $20 per 6 months and the fee
for each mile of wire per 6 months $26. In
an action for the recovery of 18 monthg
rent as imposed by the latter ordinance
the company denies the legality.
It is a well settled rule that the legality
of an ordinance is a question for the Court
to decide. The plaintiffs in this case are
without doubt a municipal corporation
and have the power to make and enforce
ordinances. The question in this case
seems to be whether or not the ordinance
is reasonable and legal.
The defendant company claim that under the Act of April 3, 1851, the last ordinance in regard to the license fee for their
poles and wires, is void and unenforceable.
The section of this act upon which their
defence rests is as follows: "The powers
of a corporation shall be vested in the
(Borough's) corporate officers designated
in the charter, they shall have power:
"To make such laws, ordinances, by-laws,
and regulations not inconsistent with the
laws of the Commonwealth as they shall
deem necessary for the good order and
government of the Borough." If in the
opinion of the Borough officers this. ordinance was necessary we will not review it.
The second question to be decided is the
reasonableness of the ordinance. The defendants maintain, first, that the sum
stated in the ordinance is so great as to be
unreasonable. It is a rule of law that an
ordinance is presumed to be reasonable
until the contrary is shown, and in this
special case we do not see the extreme unreasonableness of which the defendants
have complained. The defendants next
maintain that the ordinance is unreasonable because it applies to no other company. This company was the only one in
the Borough at that time and we do not
see how this ordinance was a special one.
We cannot presume that this ordinance
would not apply to any other Telegraph
Company should they run their line
through the Borough.
Judgment is therefore entered in favor
of the plaintiff for $3975.
C. D. JONES, J.
OPINION OF SUPREME COURT.

The borough has no power to tax the
poles and wires of the Telegraph Company, nor, had it such power, has it pretended to exercise it. The fee, if properly
Imposed, must be considered as a police
regulation.
The borough has the power to make
reasonable regulations concerning the
streets, and a responsibility abides upon it,

to keep the streets safe and practicable for
passengers, even though, under legislative
power, a telegraph company may have
planted poles on them, and connected
these poles with wires. This responsibility on the borough, justifies the latter in
extracting compensation for it from he
company. Precisely how much money
would be a fair compensation, in any case,
it would be difficult to say. Nor is a nice
adjustment between the responsibility and
the desiderated indemnity to be looked for.
So long as the indemnity demanded is not
manifestly excessive, payment of it will be
enforced by the courts.
In several cases, heretofore before the
courts, they have approved of annual Iicense fees for poles not exceeding $1 apiece,
and for wires, not exceedingS2.50 per mile.
Taylor Borough, 16 Super. 344; 2 Boroughs,
58. Dubois Borough had imposed an annual
fee on thedefendant, of $20 per pole, and $20
per mileof wire. These fees, it afterwardsincreased to $40 per pole, and $50 per mile of
wire. We think these charges utterly excessive. Thecourtbelow hasenteredajudginent for tne plaintiff for 53975, the fees for
eighteen months. Such a sum is altogether
too large for the expense of issuing the license, regulatingthe poles, insuringagainst
risk ofpecuniary liability, etc. Theexaction
of it would be a virtual prohibition of the
businessof the defendant within the limits
of Dubois.
That the reasonableness of an ordinance
is for the court, is not a disputable proposition. 1 Dillon, Munic. Corp. 404; 2 Boroughs, 43; Taylor Borough v. Postal, etc.
Co. 16 Super. 344, Lansdowne Borough v.
Water Company, 16 Super. 490. The court
may inform itself in any way, as to the
facts which determine the reasonableness
or unreasonablene'-s of the ordinance.
If the sum fixed in the ordinance is excessive, the court will not adjudge it valid
for the reasonable part of that sum, andinvalid as to the rest. A pole fee of 75 cents
or 80 cents, or 90 cents, or $1. or $1.25,
might be reasonable. It is not necessary
for the court to uphold the ordinance for
the supposed maximum reasonable fee, for
this would be. to not merely to judge the
soundness of ordinance, but to make a new
one, after deciding it to be unsound.
It does not appear distinctly whether the
first ordinance, imposi;ug a pole fee of $10
per six months, and a wire fee of$10 persix
months, was in existence when the company erected its poles and stretched its
wires. It mattersnot. Thereis no trace ofa
contract between the Company and the
borough to pay these fees, nor is the subsequent, increase of them by the borough consistent with such contract: The company
could have successfully resisted the demand for the original fees, if they were excessive; a point upon which we are not now
required to express an opinion.
It is unnecessary to decide whether the
ordinance was void because it was in terms
made applicable to the defendant alone.
Judgment reversed.

